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Choice of Law and Forum Clauses and the Recognition of
Foreign Country Judgments Revisited Through the Lloyd's of
London Cases
Courtland H. Peterson*
New interest in the recognition of foreign country judgments is now manifest,
not only in attempts to deal with these matters by treaty, but also most recently in
a new study of the subject undertaken by the American Law Institute. In earlier
times I made some modest contributions to the investigation of this field, mainly
characterized by the proposal that such recognition should be tested and governed
by the principles of res judicata, rather than by the ill-defined doctrine of comity
of nations.' In the interim I have welcomed the development of several uniform
laws in this area, as well as the work done in the Second Restatement of Conflict of
Laws, and the growth of a substantial body of literature on the subject of
recognition.2 In the case law, a substantial majority of courts in this country have
now evidenced a willingness to recognize and enforce the judgments of foreign
countries, primarily in terms of resjudicata theory.'
The policies embodied in res judicata, ideally, represent a balance between
judicial efficiency and fairness in the individual case. The core concept of due
process of law is the proposition that everyone must have an opportunity for a full
and fair hearing in a legal controversy. Its correlative is the proposition that
relitigation of issues already fairly decided is not only wasteful ofjudicial resources,
but also can be as unfair to the victor in the earlier proceeding as denial of a hearing
would have been to the loser. In the domestic context, deciding whether a litigant
has already had the opportunity for a full and fair hearing is a fairly straightforward
matter. Even at the next level, decision as to whether a party should be precluded
by prior litigation in another state of the United States is relatively easy. A common
language and shared legal heritage help to assure that tests of fairness in the
adequacy of a prior hearing will have a high degree of similarity if not identity. The
Full Faith and Credit Clause of our Constitution operates as a unifying force,
requiring states to give the same effect to judgments of sister states as those
proceedings would have in the place of origin. Failure to do so invites reversal and
Copyright 2000, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Courtland H. Peterson, ResJudicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Ohio State L. J.
291-321 (1963); Die Anerkennung auslaendischer Urteile in den Vereinigten Staaten, Metzner Verlag,
Frankfurt/M. pp. 161 (1964) (Monograph No. 18 in der Reihe Arbeiten zur Rechtsvergleichung
published by the German Society of Comparative Law); Die Anerkennung und Vollstreckung
auslaendischer Urteile in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, 33 Rabels Z. 543-63 (1969); Foreign
Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of€Conflict ofLaws, 72 Colum. L. Rev. 220-66 (1972).
2. See Eugene F. Scoles & Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws, 956-62, 996-1024 (2d ed. 1992)
(collecting much of the modem literature and case law).
3. Id. at 1003, concluding that the modem trend toward recognition includes collateral estoppel
as well as the traditional forms of resjudicata.
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enforcement by the federal courts, as a clear expression of our concept of
federalism.
International recognition of judgments is obviously much more problematic.
The absence of any cognate for the Full Faith and Credit Clause, except as provided
by treaty,4 means that each nation is free to recognize and enforce foreign
judgments according to its own law, or to refuse such recognition altogether.' In
the United States, an additional element of diversity is added by the fact that
conflict of laws is regarded as a matter of state law rather than federal, with the
consequence that each state of the United States is free to make its own decision
about recognition of foreign country judgments.6
Many countries have regulated recognition practice through either bilateral or
multilateral treaties, and the United States has done so with respect to the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.7 With respect to the recognition of
foreign countryjudgments, however, the United States has thus far not followed this
route.8 A first attempt to establish a bilateral treaty occurred in 1977, when such a
proposal governing recognition between the United States and the United Kingdom
received preliminary approval.9 Despite numerous revisions and attempted
compromises final adoption of this document has never occurred, probably because
of British resistance to the implementation of American tort and anti-trust law.' °
Many observers, myself included, had assumed that such a treaty with the U.K.
was a feasible project. A common language, shared legal traditions, and similar
views of the prickly question of personal jurisdiction over transients made
agreement between these two countries most promising. There even seems to be a
high degree of similarity between the English and American views of res judicata.
4. Recognition between member states of the European Communities has been regulated by the
Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters since 1975, a document sometimes described as the "Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
European Union." See Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market, 24 Int. &
Comp. L. Q. 44 (1975). The effects of this convention were extended to the members of the European
Free Trade Association by the Lugano Convention of 1988. Somewhat similar provisions have been
adopted by the Organization of American States and are in force in at least eight Central and South
American countries. See generally Scoles & Hay, supra note 2, at 1003-07.
5. Among western nations France was one of the last major holdouts refusing to recognize
foreign judgments in the absence of a complete reexamination of the merits; but even this barrier finally
fell. See Kurt H. Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign Money Judgments: One Down and
More to Go, 13 Am J. Comp. L. 72 (1964).
6. Banque Libanaise Pour Le Commerce v. Khreich, 915 F.2d 1000 (5th Cir. 1990); Nelson
Bunker Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Somportex Ltd.
v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Pa. 1970). Cf Taylor v. LSI Logic Corp.,
715 A.2d 837 (Del. 1998).
7. The United States acceded to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in 1970; T.I.A.S. No. 6997, and Congress implemented the
Convention by passing a new chapter to the United States Arbitration Act. 9 U.S.C. § 201.
8. Such a treaty would, of course, pre-empt state law under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const.
art. VI.
9. See Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-Judgments Convention Between the
United States and the United Kingdom, 1 T ex. Int'l L.J. 421 (1976).
10. See Scoles& Hay, supra note 2, at 1007.
1260 (Vol. 60
COURTLAND H. PETERSON
Moreover, few of us would have supposed that American courts were likely to be.
confronted with English judgments whose recognition would be seriously opposed
on the grounds of public policy or on the theory that American litigants had been
denied due process by the English courts. Yet, that is precisely the situation that is
now unfolding in a series of cases involving Lloyd's of London, arising out of
events now developing into an insurance scandal of international proportions and
impacting thousands of American investors.
The purpose of this essay is to describe the broad outlines of these events and
to discuss their implications for the future of American recognition practice. I will
discuss some of the devices which Lloyd's has used to evade or avoid the traditional
defenses to recognition, including the use of choice-of-forum and choice-of-law
clauses, arbitration clauses, and the appointment of agents empowered, in effect, to
confess judgment on behalf of American investors. I am concerned that the lower
federal courts in the Lloyd's cases have inappropriately extended the enforceability
of such clauses, and also that they have given inadequate attention to the
requirement that state law apply in diversity cases. In conclusion, I will suggest that
future cases, as well as the scholarly attention now being directed at recognition in
this area, should explore the development of techniques which American courts
might use to protect our citizens without sacrificing the benefits of a civilized
recognition practice.
I. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE LLOYD'S CASES
The main outline of the facts in these controversies do not appear to be
seriously disputed, although the intentions and culpability of many individual
participants are in issue. The following description is drawn from judicial opinions
in some of the cases involved, from pleadings, affidavits and briefs filed in such
cases, from other law review articles, and from several investigative reports
concerning these matters. In addition, I have read much of the information
available in a web site established by the American investors, and interested persons
may also wish to consult that source for more detail or further references." At the
outset, it should be made clear that Lloyd's is not an insurance company in the sense
that we have such enterprises in our system. It is rather a "society" which was
established about 300 years ago, incorporated in 1871, and has historically acted as
an association of individual insurers. Its primary function has been to regulate the
insurance market which takes place within the association. There is a governing
body drawn from the membership, which not only establishes and enforces rules by
which the members must conduct themselves, as well as rules of eligibility for and
withdrawal from the association, but also raises capital. To invest in underwriting
11. See <www.truthaboutlloyds.com> (sponsored by the American Names Association). While
this source is highly informative, it is, of course, provided from an advocate's point of view and should
be treated accordingly. Also on the Internet is a Special Report by TIME EUROPE on the Decline and
Fall of Lloyd's of London (See <www.pathfinder.com/time/europemagazine/200/Uoyds.html>) Feb.
21, 2000, vol. 155, No. 7. An abbreviated version of this report appears in Time, Feb. 28, 2000, pp.
54-60.
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activities in the Lloyd's market, an individual had to become a member, or a
"Name," by entering into an Agency Agreement with a Member's Agent, who then
invested on behalf of the Name in one or more syndicates. Each syndicate is
managed by a Managing Agent and will typically specialize in a particular type of
insurance. Syndicates are not themselves entities, but are merely associations of
individual Names. In order to become a Name, an individual was required to prove
his or her financial worth and to deposit a specified sum in the form of a letter of
credit issued in favor of Lloyd's. Names are liable without limit for their shares in
the syndicates in which they invest (perhaps more accurately, in the syndicates in
which their Member's Agent has invested on their behalf).
Originally established to provide insurance in the maritime industry, the
syndicates accepted applications for insurance risks for one year, then allowed two
more years for claims to come in and be settled. Each syndicate closed its "year of
account" and wound up its affairs after the end of the third year, at which time the
Names received their share of the profits, or paid their share of the losses, and their
liability ended. Until that closure each Name pledged his entire personal wealth to
back up his share in the syndicate's policies. If all claims could not be settled by
the end of the third year the syndicate had to remain "open" and the profits and
losses could not be shared among the Names involved until all claims were finally
settled.
This three-year cycle worked reasonably well when insurance risks were
confined to the maritime business, since the outcome of any given voyage would
almost certainly be known within a year and claims settled within three. As Lloyd's
expanded into non-maritime insurance, however, outstanding claims meant that
syndicates frequently could not close their affairs within three years. Staying open
longer, however, delayed the distribution ofprofits, and these delays were a serious
disincentive to investment. Lloyd's solution was to have each closing syndicate
pass the entire portfolio of policies it had written ("book of business"), as well as
reserves to cover future claims against these policies, forward to syndicates which
were still active. Although not strictly speaking "reinsurance" as defined in
standard insurance business practice, Lloyd's called this portfolio transfer
"Reinsurance to Close" (RITC). The reserves passed on to the successor syndicate
to cover claims not yet made or settled were designated as "premiums." Since the
successor syndicate assumed all the liabilities of the predecessor, RITC transactions
allowed the syndicates to continue the practice of closing and distributing profits
after three years. The problem was, of course, that as this type of transfer was
repeated annually over many years, the investors in the most recent syndicate
became personally liable for all of the latent liabilities of its predecessor syndicates.
Unless the reserves (premiums in the RITC) passed on to the successor were
adequate to pay the potential future claims, the result of using this device was to
build a "time bomb" of liability. The creation of such time bombs was encouraged
by conflicts of interest, since the profits which could be taken out as a syndicate
"closed" would be reduced by the amount of reserves passed on to the successor.
The latent claims would ultimately have to be paid, often by investors having no
relationship to the Names who took their profits out ofthe earlier syndicates. In one
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example given by the investors, the Sturge agency's syndicate number 210 was first
established in 1920. At the end of 1971, by "reinsuring to close" Sturge 210 of
1969, Sturge 210 of 1970 took on liability for potential claims against policies
written ever since 1920, because each successive syndicate had "reinsured to close"
its predecessor.
Many of the general liability policies written by Lloyd's underwriters in the
United States prior to 1968 were issued in broad form, unlimited both as to
aggregate claims and exposure, and insuring against asbestos, pollution, and health
hazard claims. The billions of dollars of losses suffered by Lloyd's Names in the
late 1980s and early 1990's were a direct result of this type of chain or "tail" of
latent liabilities for claims from these kinds of losses.
The assertions of the American investors in Lloyd's, who have formed
themselves into an American Names Association (ANA), are essentially as
follows.
Until about 1970, only citizens of the UK could become Names, and
membership consisted of about 6000 wealthy Britons. Many of these were persons
with titles and many had close connections to high-level government offices. This
group was composed of both active Names, who were active underwriters of
policies, managers of syndicates, and member's agents, together with external
Names, who were passive investors not permitted to play any active role. For
purposes of clarity, the active underwriters, managers, and member's agents are
usually referred to as "insiders," as opposed to the external Names, the passive
investors who had no control over actual underwriting. Lloyd's ruling committee,
which was comprised entirely of insiders, brokers, and senior executives running
the syndicates, learned during the 1960s of the potential future liability posed by
discoveries about the hazards of asbestos and other pollutants. An investigative
report called the Cromer Commission Report was issued in 1969, recommending
that new Names be actively recruited so that additional assets would be available
to meet impending losses, and that recruitment be facilitated by reducing the assets
which each Name had to prove in order to establish membership. In 1972 Lloyd's
opened its membership to Americans, and thereafter also began recruitment of
Names in other countries. Membership rose to over 10,000 in 1977, to over 23,000
in 1984, and peaked at 32,433 in 1988. In 1981, the governing committee formed
an "Asbestos Working Party," which revealed to insiders the potential dimensions
of the impending disaster. According to the ANA, both the Cromer Report and the
information developed by the Working Party were suppressed and the new Names
being recruited were not informed of the probable liability which their membership
entailed. 2 Also according to the ANA, the purpose of this expansion was not only
to provide more assets to absorb the impending losses, but also to allow insiders to
12. The new Names were certainly informed that their individual liability was several and
unlimited. In order to become a Name, the new inductee was required to go to London and to
participate in an elaborate ritual not unlike an initiation ceremony, in the course of which they were
told, according to one American Name, that they were liable for debts of the syndicates "down to their
last cuff-link." What the new Names were not told, of course, was that losses rather than profits were
the highly probable prospect of their investment.
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avoid future liability by leaving those syndicates which were at risk. 3 If
true, what was involved was a gigantic Ponzi scheme, virtually fraudulent by
definition.
In addition to expanding capital by recruiting new (and unsuspecting)
Names, Lloyd's took two other protective measures during the 1980's. First,
it lobbied for and succeeded in obtaining a new 'private act' of the British
Parliament, entitled the Lloyd's Act of 1982, which not only provided
Lloyd's with a wide latitude of immunity from legal liability but also gave
the governing Council of Lloyd's broad new powers of self-regulation.' 4 The
latter permitted the Council unilaterally (perhaps even retroactively) to amend
the Lloyd's By-Laws, which until then could only be amended by a'majority
vote of the Names at a General Meeting. The Council, of course, was and is
composed of Lloyd's insiders. The Names who were passive, external investors,
assert that they were not informed of the extent and implications of these
changes until 1991, when the losses for the 1988 year of account became public
knowledge.
Second, Lloyd's required all Names to sign a new General Undertaking, which
included choice of forum and choice of law clauses under which they "agreed" that
all legal disputes would be brought in English court and decided under English
law. "5 These provisions were explained to the Names as a "procedural technicality."
13. The ANA reports that Mr. Ralph Rokeby-Johnson, for example, a senior underwriter and later
a member of the Asbestos Working Party, advised his close friends in 1973 that asbesteosis claims
would bankrupt Lloyd's, and in the following year reinsured all of his pre-1969 liabilities with two
American companies. These reinsurers were later successful in rescinding their policies on the ground
of nondisclosure of material facts, and the risks were then off-loaded to two other Lloyd's syndicates,
Merritt and Outhwaite. They also tried to rescind but were unable to do so, and this coverage was
instrumental in the ruin ofboth syndicates. Rokeby-Johnson has reportedly retired to California, where
he now enjoys a very superior lifestyle. Support for the first part of this assertion is found in an affidavit
submitted in a case filed in Utah state court by the Attorney General of that state against Lloyd's in
1996, by a senior underwriter named Roger Bradley, who had worked at Lloyd's from 1957 until 1986.
Utah v. Lloyd's of London, Utah Third Judicial District, Case No. 960902920CV.
14. The ANA reports that about 50 insider Names were members of the British Parliament which
passed this immunity statute, giving rise to serious questions of conflict of interest on their part.
15. The text of the clauses was, in pertinent part, as follows:
The rights and obligations of the parties arising out of or relating to the Member's
membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at, Lloyd's and any other matter
referred to in this Undertaking shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the
laws of England.
Each party hereto irrevocably agrees that the courts of England shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any dispute and/or controversy of whatsoever nature arising out of or
relating to the Member's membership of, and/or underwriting of insurance business at,
Lloyd's and that accordingly any suit, action or... arising out of or relating to such matters
shall be brought in such courts and, to this end, each party hereto irrevocably agrees to
submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of England....
Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 955-56 (10th Cir. 1992).
The General Undertaking between the Names and Member's Agents also included similar
clauses referring to English law and courts, but in addition had a provision for mandatory
arbitration in England.
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They proved, however, to be critical in litigation in American courts in the 1990s,
after the massive losses caused by reinsurance to close and retrocessional 6
insurance were disclosed.
When the catastrophic losses produced by these long tails of liability began to
emerge in the 1990s, Lloyd's first paid claims out of premium reserves and then
began sending cash calls to Names on the syndicates involved, at first passing these
off as losses attributable to extraordinary events such as hurricanes and oil spills or
oil rig fires. In 1991, Lloyd's announced losses of 500 million pounds (about $800
million), portraying them as "short tail" claims of this type, although they
represented historical record losses at that point. In fact, however, these "Act of
God" losses served only as a temporary smokescreen for the true nature of
impending losses, primarily attributable to asbesteosis and other health hazard
claims, which by 1995 had grown to $14 billion (by Lloyd's own, unaudited,
accounting figures).
In the face of such losses, it became increasingly apparent that the customary
RITC procedure could not continue to function, to allow active syndicates to close.
Lloyd's response was to create a gigantic new reinsurance enterprise, called
Equitas, into which almost all of the pre-1992 liabilities of all of the then-active
syndicates would be moved. This allowed new syndicates to be formed without the
"tail" of past claims so that the Lloyd's market could continue to sell insurance.
This program was called "Reconstruction and Renewal" (R&R). The reserves of
Equitas were funded from a variety of sources, most importantly by the participation
of all of the Names in prior syndicates which had been unable to close.' 7 This was
accomplished in two ways.
First, the Names were made an "Offer of Settlement"' conditioned upon their
payment of an additional 1.4 billion pounds. Although not ending Names' future
liability if Equitas was unable to pay all claims, this offer did give them some
respite from enforcement. As further inducement, Names accepting the offer were
to be awarded "credits" against the amount required to be paid in, to be derived
from impounded litigation recoveries and the strength of the claims of each
individual Name, as judged by Lloyd's. To obtain these credits, however, Names
accepting the offer were required to give complete releases to Lloyd's, the brokers,
underwriting agents, auditors (and others), waiving all claims for damage or
rescission-including even claims arising out of misrepresentations in the offer of
id. at 955.
16. The ANA alleges that the massive recruitment of new Names produced an excess of new
capital, and that, in order to keep this "excess capital" in the market "in play," syndicate managers
unnecessarily insured other syndicates against excessive loss during their years of account and in effect
obtained reinsurance on reinsurance (which is called retrocessional insurance). The ultimate effect was
to magnify the losses in the syndicates in which such reinsurance was placed.
17. Lloyd's calculated the premium required for such reinsurance at 14.7 billion pounds, as
against 9.9 billion pounds of syndicate assets then on hand. For the other sources relied upon see
Defendants' Memorandum of Law at 23, in Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, No. 98-C-5335, 1999 WL
284775 (N.D. 111. Apr. 23, 1999).
18. Actually loyd's made a succession of such offers to the Names, each in turn on slightly
better terms but none offering a real end to potential liability.
12652000]
6LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
settlement itself. 9 By the end of 1996, about 85 percent of Names worldwide had
accepted this offer, and eventually over 90 percent did so. Several thousand
American Names accepted the offer, but about 600 did not.
Second, as to the Names who rejected the offer (hereafter called the non-
accepting Names), Lloyd's Council exercised the by-law or self-regulatory power
granted to it by the Lloyd's Act of 1982 in a most extraordinary way. It simply
ordained that the agency relationships between non-accepting Names and their
member's agents were terminated. It then appointed a new Substitute Agent, called
Additional Underwriting Agency N. 9 (AUA9), to act on their behalf. Lloyd's then
ordered AUA9 to sign the Equitas reinsurance contract on behalf of the non-
accepting Names, which it did, and thus all Names were put into Equitas ° Lloyd's
then paid into Equitas the premiums which, according to Lloyd's calculations, were
owed by each of the non-accepting Names (without the credits given to accepting
Names), and took assignments from Equitas of its claim for these premiums under
the contract. This thus set the stage for Lloyd's to set about suing the non-accepting
Names on these assigned claims.
In the litigation which has followed, two provisions of the Equitas contract
have proved to be critical. The first of these, Paragraph 5.5, came to be called the
"pay now, sue later" clause, and provided in essence that the Name in question was
required to pay the amount claimed by Lloyd's up front, without any setoff or
counterclaim of any kind, without seeking any stay of execution or injunction
against enforcement, and consented to the immediate enforcement ofanyjudgment
obtained by Lloyds. Under this clause, no cause of action for any claim in
connection with the obligation to make such payment would accrue to the Name
until the premium in question had been fully paid. The second clause, Paragraph
5.10, came to be called the "conclusive evidence" clause. Under it, the amount of
the payment to be made was that calculated by the Members' Services Unit (MSU)
of Lloyd's, and these calculations were to be "conclusive evidence as between the
Name and Equitas, in the absence of manifest error."2'
In an extraordinary series of cases decided by the English courts in 1997 and
1998,22 these two clauses were given precisely the effects intended by Lloyd's.
Judgments were, in effect, "confessed" against the non-accepting Names, for the full
19. For example, Mr. and Mrs. Ashenden of Illinois, who were both Names, had already met
calls of Lloyd's for $304,000 between 1992 and 1995. In 1996 they were informed they were required
to pay an additional $643,000, but were offered "credits" which would reduce this amount to about
$320,000 if they accepted the offer of settlement. See Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 17, at 24.
20. The Ashendens instructed their members agent not to sign the contract, and there appears to
have been an argument that the agent was legally bound to follow this instruction, but in Lloyd's view
AUA9 was not so restricted. Id. at 25.
21. .The text of these provisions is set out in full in the Ashenden Memo, supra note 17, at 25-27.
22. See, e.g., Society of Lloyd's v. Leighs, 1997 WL 1104500, 1997 C.L.C. 1398 (CA July
31,1997); Society of Lloyd's v. Fraser, 1997 WL 1103612, 1998 C.L.C. 127 (Q.B.D. Comm. Ct. Dec.
3,1997), 1998 WL 1043675, 1998 C.L.C. 1630 (CA July 31, 1998). But cf Garrow v. Society of
Lloyd's, 1999 WL 819070, 2000 C.L.C. 241 (CA Oct. 13, 1999), where the Court of Appeal in a
bankruptcy case permitted the Name in question to file a counterclaim in a pending case against Lloyd's
based on fraud, as an exercise of the discretionary power of the bankruptcy court.
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amount of premiums as calculated by Lloyd's. The Names who were defendants
in these cases were not permitted to challenge them in any way, until after the
judgments were paid in full. They were not permitted to raise any defenses to the
claims, including claims of fraud against Lloyd's itself. The Names in theory could
challenge the amounts claimed by Lloyd's on the ground of "manifest error." Yet,
they were not permitted any discovery as to the calculation process used by Lloyd's
or into the source material used in the calculation. Although numerous
discrepancies of substantial proportions were shown, even in the documents
produced by the MSU itself, these were not treated as manifest error. The resulting
judgments against American non-accepting names are now being presented for
recognition and enforcement in American courts, and it is that process of
recognition and enforcement with which the final part of this essay is concerned.
Before turning to a consideration of this process, however, we should consider
the attempts made to reach the merits of the claims raised by this factual
background, even before Equitas came into the picture. In England, these pre-
emptive efforts primarily took the form of actions by the Names against active
underwriters, member's agents and managers. These claims alleged negligence or
fraud, based on the agents' breach of fiduciary duty to their principals through
failure to disclose the impending deluge of liability known by insiders to exist, but
concealed from external Names. Many, if not all, of these suits were successful,
resulting in the award of damages totaling about 1.5 billion English pounds,23 but
most of these damages awards were never paid. According to the ANA, successful
litigants were never given the option of receiving such damage awards. Instead, in
1994, the Lloyd's Council unilaterally amended the by-laws relating to Premium
Trust Deeds, which govern a Name's obligation to pay Lloyd's for losses
allegedly owed by Lloyd's syndicates, so that, with one exception, the 1.5
billion pounds in awards and settlements went directly to Lloyd's. I have
spoken with one American Name who lost $45,000 and another who lost over
$300,000 in this fashion. These funds were presumably used as part of the reserves
for Equitas.
II. PRE-EMPTIVE EFFORTS IN THE UNITED STATES
Attempts by American Names to get to the merits of the Lloyd's fiasco have
taken several different forms. The primary effort took the form of actions brought
in American courts against Lloyd's and/or Member's Agents for violations of
American statutes regulating the sale of securities in this country. Such laws are to
be found not only at the federal level but also under state law.
4
23. To the extent that damages were awarded in arbitration the awards are normally not only
unpublished but are also confidential. Apparently many of the court cases in question were also not
published.
24. Another pre-emptive effort made by the American Names was the effort to alert the state
insurance commissioners and attorneys general in all American states to the questionable financial
viability of Lloyd's. In 1996, Securities Regulators in 13 states issued Cease and Desist Orders against
Lloyd's based on claims of violations of state laws regulating the sale of securities.
12672000]
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The catastrophic nature of the "long-tail" health hazard policies issued by
Lloyd's syndicates over the years. came to light in the early 1990s. American
Names then filed actions in federal district courts in at least six different circuits,
claiming they had been defrauded by Lloyd's and various Lloyd's insiders and
promoters. These claims were based primarily on the Securities Act of 19335 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,26 the purpose of which was to protect
investors from unscrupulous securities dealers and to facilitate informed decision-
making by investors. Enacted by Congress in response to widespread fraud in
securities markets, the principal device established by the Acts is the requirement
that persons selling or offering to sell securities disclose to potential investors the
risks associated with the securities in question. This is implemented by imposing
liability on anyone who, in offering or selling a security, "makes an untrue statement
of a material fact or omits to state a material fact."" These provisions are coupled
with anti-waiver provisions designed to assure that the parties cannot contract out
of these statutory protections.2 The actions brought in these cases alleged
violations of these Acts consisting of nondisclosure in connection with the
plaintiffs' initial recruitment as Names, their placement in high-risk syndicates, and
pressure placed upon them to increase their underwriting limits. The relief sought
typically included declaratory judgment and rescission as well as damages.29 Some
of the actions also alleged violations of state laws regulating the sale of securities,
as well as common law fraud. 0
In all of these cases, Lloyd's filed motions to dismiss claiming that the forum-
selection and choice-of-law clauses in the General Undertaking signed by the
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77 a-77a.
26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77mm.
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77 1(2).
28. See Securities Act of 1933 §14, 15 U.S.C. 77n. "Any condition, stipulation, or provision
binding any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the [Securities Exchange] Commission shall be void." The Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §29(a), 15 U.S.C. 78cc(a), also provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or
provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of an exchange required thereby shall be void."
29. Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd., 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992), aff'g No. 91-
C-1411, 1991 WL330770 (D. Col. Aug. 30, 1991)cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1021, 113 S. Ct. 658 (1992);
Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993), aff'g 784 F. Supp. 1350 (N.D. I1. 1992), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 11 13s 114 S. Ct. 1057 (1994); Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (7th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 945, 114 S. Ct. 385 (1993); Haynsworth v. The Corporation also
know as Lloyd's of London, 121 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1997); Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d
1289 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (withdrawing panel opinion at 107 F.3d 1422 and aff'g trial court); No.
94-121 1-IEQ(POR), 1995 WL465687 (S.D. Cal. May 1, 1995), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943, 119 S. Ct.
365 (1998); Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998). See also Allen v.
Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923 (4th Cir. 1996), in which 93 Names sued in federal district court in
Virginia, after the R&R offer, to force Lloyd's to disclose more financial information. A trial court
order of disclosure was reversed on appeal, on the basis of the forum selection clause.
30. E.g., Riley, 969 F.2d at 956. In several of these cases the primary basis of asserted liability
was state law: Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1995)(Ohio Blue Sky Law); West v.
Lloyd's, No. B095440, 1997 WL 1114662 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 23, 1997)(Califomia Securities
Law)(Not selected for official publication but available on Westlaw and through the ANA).
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Names required that any such actions be brought only in English courts and
under English law. In cases joining Member's Agents or underwriters as
defendants, the argument was also made that arbitration in England was mandatory.
In all of these cases save one, Lloyds has been ultimately successful in obtaining
dismissal in the American federal courts, on the ground that these clauses should be
enforced.' That result has been ably and persuasively criticized in a scholarly
work, analyzing the cases decided before its publication. It argues that such
enforcement is directly contrary to the anti-waiver provisions of the American
Securities Acts, and ignores the strong policies favoring protection of American
investors.
3 2
For purposes of this discussion, I will focus on Lipcon v. Underwriters at
Lloyd's," the most recent of these cases. In Lipcon, the court conceded that the
anti-waiver provisions "facially admit of no exceptions," but concluded that the
"framework for evaluating choice clauses in international agreements" established
by MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 34 "governs this case." " In applying the
Bremen evaluation the court concluded that the clauses in question were
enforceable under applicable public-policy tests because the court was "confident"
that the policies underlying American securities laws could be vindicated in
litigation in the English courts.36 In doing so, it ignored the plain language of the
statutes, an amicus brief filed by the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission in
support of the Names, and the scholarly criticism of the other Circuits' cases. Its
confidence in the English courts and English law was not even shaken by the fact
that Lloyd's was exempted from the English Misrepresentations Act by
Section 14 of the Lloyd's Act of 1982, which the court conceded. It found solace
in the fact that member's agents and managers of the syndicates were not so
exempted. 7
In my opinion, the court in Lipcon was mistaken in its basic premise,
namely, that Bremen provides the "governing" law for evaluating the validity
of choice of forum and choice-of-law clauses in these cases. Bremen was
(and is) the leading American case enforcing a choice-of-forum clause in an
international contract. It involved a contract between an American owner of
an off-shore drilling rig and a German shipping corporation under which the
latter was to tow the rig with its ship (the Bremen) from the Gulf of
Mexico to the Adriatic Sea off Italy. In addition to a forum selection clause
under which any disputes were to be resolved in the English courts, the
contract provisions included certain exculpatory clauses which would not have
been enforceable in a domestic admiralty case in the United States on
31. The one exception, West v. Lloyd's, is discussed infra, text at notes 68-71.
32. Darrell Hall, No Way Out: An Argument Against Permitting Parties to Opt Out of U.S.
Securities Laws in International Transactions, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 57 (1997).
33. 148 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1998).
34. 407 U.S. 1, 92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972).
35. 148 F.3d at 1292.
36. Id. at 1299 (citing Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993)).
37. Id. at 1297.
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grounds that they were contrary to public policy (as established in prior
admiralty law).
In enforcing the forum selection clause, the United States Supreme Court
emphasized two important aspects of the case presented. First, the case involved
a truly international contract, in which the American party was seeking to rely on
a rule of domestic policy, and the Court concluded that insistence on imposition of
that policy would be a parochial view of the international business community and
an impediment to international trade."8 Second, the forum claus6 in question was
not imposed by one dominant party upon the other, as in adhesion contracts, but
rather was fully negotiated between two large, sophisticated corporations dealing
at arms length. 9 In this setting, the Court concluded that such clauses should be
enforced.
Two features of Bremen make it clearly distinguishable from the Lloyd's cases.
First, the Court itself clearly recognized that it was deciding the issue for "federal
district courts sitting in admiralty,"40 and thus set a binding precedent only for
admiralty cases. Second, the policy against enforcement of exculpatory clauses in
towage contracts was a matter of common law admiralty law established in an
earlier Supreme Court case.4' As the ultimate appellate court sitting in admiralty,
the Court was obviously at liberty to change that rule or, as it in fact did in Bremen,
to reinterpret it to restrict its scope to domestic towage contracts.42 Without
question, the Court would have been confronted with a completely different issue
if the policy against exculpatory clauses had been embodied in a federal statute
specifically prohibiting the enforcement of such clauses.
.To be sure, this analysis of the actual holding in Bremen does not prevent it
from becoming persuasive authority in other courts and other types of cases, and
indeed that is precisely what has occurred. Bremen has been widely cited and its
reasoning adopted, for example, by many state courts in cases not involving either
admiralty or international contracts, and the 1986 revision of § 80 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws takes the position that choice-of-forum
clauses should be enforced unless unreasonable or unfair."3 Some lower courts have
even taken the view that Bremen establishes a federal common law rule applicable
in diversity cases as well as those based on federal law." The Supreme Court,
however, has not adopted that view, even when the opportunity to do so presented
itself, and has left that question open. '
38. 407 U.S. at 9-11, 15,92 S. Ct. at 1912-13, 1916.
39. Id. at 12-14,92 S. Ct. at 1914-15.
40. Id. at 10, 92 S. Ct. at 1913.
41. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 75 S. Ct. 629 (1955).
42. 407 U.S. at 15-16,92 S. Ct. at 1916.
43. See Scoles & Hay, supra note 2, at 366- 67.
44. Id. at 365. See, e.g., Ronar, Inc. v. Wallace, 649 F. Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), Int'l
Software Sys, Inc. v. Amplicon Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 114 (5th Cir. 1996).
45. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.,487 U.S. 22,108 S. Ct. 2239(1988),presents the question
whether federal law governed the transfer of a case from federal court in Alabama to federal court in
New York, under the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), where the contract in dispute
contained a clause selecting the New York forum, but Alabama law was hostile to such clauses. The
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Three other Supreme Court cases have formed the basis of the opinions of the
courts which have enforced the forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses in the
Lloyd's cases. None of these, I submit, has provided any firm basis for the Liptcon
court's conclusion that Bremen is "governing law" in the Lloyd's cases. One of
these cases, Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute,' enforced an interstate forum-
selection clause in a ship's-passage ticket, notwithstanding the adhesionary nature
of that contract. This was, of course, also an admiralty case, and therefore binding
federal law on that basis.47 Although its holding unfortunately weakened the "freely
negotiated" requirement of Bremen, it did so in the context of a case where only
inconvenience and no strong public policy opposed the transfer.4 ,
The other two cases on which reliance is placed in the Lloyd's cases both
involved arbitration clauses, and were decided under the Federal Arbitration Act.49
On that basis alone, therefore, neither case supports the existence of a common law
rule favoring forum-selection clauses and, when closely examined, neither case fully
supports the position of the Lloyd's underwriters, even in those cases involving
arbitration clauses." The first of these, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,5 involved
a contract for purchase of several business enterprises in Europe by an American
corporation, and included a clause providing for arbitration in Paris. Later claiming
that the seller had been guilty of fraudulent misrepresentations as to the status of
trademarks involved in the sale, the buyer brought an action for damages in Illinois,
alleging that the seller's conduct constituted violations of the U.S. Securities Acts.
The seller sought a stay pending arbitration, but lost in the courts below because
prior authority had held that an arbitration clause could not preclude a buyer of a
security from seeking a judicial remedy under the Securities Acts.' The Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the parties' agreement to arbitrate should be respected
and enforced because such a clause is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause.' This device removes one of the uncertainties in international
Court held it was a matter of federal law involving the interpretation of the scope of the federal statute.
Two justices (Kennedy and O'Connor) concurred in Ricoh on the theory that the question was one of
federal common law, while one (Scalia) dissented on the ground that the validity of forum-selection
clauses should be left to state law. See also Scoles & Hay, supra note 2, at 365-66.
46. 499U.S.585, III S.Ct. 1522 (1991).
47. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Superior Court, 222 Cal. App. 3d 1548,272 Cal. Rptr. 515
(1990), vacated for reconsideration in light of Shute in 499 U.S. 972, 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991), narrowly
construed on remand in 234 Cal. App. 3d 1019, 286 Cal. Rptr. 323 (2d Dist.1991).
48. The Shute case did involve interpretation of a federal statute declaring some kinds of contract
clauses void. See 46 U.S.C. App. § 183 c(d). The Court interpreted this provision as forbidding only
clauses which waived the right to ajudicial hearing. Schute, 499 U.S. at 595-97, 111 S. Ct. at 1528-29.
There was never any question about the availability or adequacy of the remedies available in the Florida
courts, to which the forum-selection clause referred disputes.
49. 15U.S.C. § I.
50. See supra note 14.
51. 417 U.S. 506, 94 S. Ct. 2449(1974).
52. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 74 S. Ct. 182 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,484,485, 109 S. Ct. 1917, 1921, 1922 (1989) (over
four dissents).
53. 417 U.S. at 519, 94 S. Ct. at 2457.
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dispute-resolution (citing Bremen), and this result is buttressed by the strong
policies favoring arbitration. As for the protective policies of the Securities Acts,
the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the contracts in this case involved
the sale of securities. What it did say, however, was that fraud of the kind which
Alberto-Culver alleged could presumably be raised in challenging the enforcement
of any arbitral award which might be obtained by Sherk, on the grounds that it was
contrary to public policy, should Sherk seek to enforce such an award under the
treaty.' Moreover, since the parties in Sherk had agreed (in the arbitration clause)
that the "laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A., shall apply to and govern this
agreement, its interpretation and performance,"5 it would appear that any refusal
by the arbitral tribunal in France to apply the protective provisions of those laws to
Alberto-Culver would provide a similar defense to enforcement.
The second case was Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth
Inc.,56 which also enforced a clause in an international contract, in this instance
calling for arbitration in Japan. Soler resisted its enforcement on the ground that
Mitsubishsi had violated American antitrust laws, and relied on prior authority that
the judicial remedies for such violations cannot be displaced by agreements to
arbitrate." Again relying on the desirability of a non-parochial approach to
international commerce, and citing Bremen, as well as on the strong federal policy
favoring arbitration, the Court denied Soler any immediate access to the federal
courts. In so doing, however, the Court was not confronted with a situation in
which Soler would be denied the protection of the American laws. Counsel for
Mitsubishi conceded in oral argument that American law applied to the antitrust
claims, and represented that the claims had been submitted to the arbitration panel
in Japan on that basis." Moreover, referring to the possibility that the panel might
decline to apply these laws, the Court said:
Nor need we consider now the effect of an arbitral tribunal's failure to take
cognizance of the statutory cause of action on the claimant's capacity to
reinitiate suit in federal court. We merely note that in the event the
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a
prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for
antitrust violation, we would have little hesitation in condemning the
agreement as against public policy."9 (emphasis added)
In the face of that language, it is quite astonishing that the Lipcon court
conceded that the Equitas contract clauses "may operate in 'tandem' as a
prospective waiver of the statutory remedies for securities violations"6 ° and
nevertheless, proceeded to find that they were not against public policy. It did so,
54. Id. at 519 n.14, 94 S. Ct. at 2457 n.14.
55. Id. at 508-09 n.1, 94 S. Ct. at 245 n.1.
56. 473 U.S. 614, 105 S. Ct. 3346 (1985).
57. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1967).
58. 473 U.S. at 637 n.19, 105 S. Ct. 3359 n.19.
59. Id.
60. Lipton v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 148 F.3d 1285-98 (11 th Cir. 1998).
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it explained, not only for the reasons cited by the other circuit courts, but also
because it concluded that the "English remedies are adequate to provide redress...
to appellant's United States securities claims."'
I have no problem with the policies developed in the case law of the
Supreme Court in Bremen, Scherk, Mitsubishi, and Shute, so far as these are
used to create a favorable climate for the enforcement of choice-of-law and
forum-selection clauses, namely, an internationalist view which promotes
certainty and trust in international commerce, and promotes speedy and
efficient resolution of disputes. Within that climate the enforceability of such
clauses should, all other things being equal, enjoy a presumption of
enforceability
All other things are not equal, however, when these judicially formulated
policies find themselves in direct conflict with specific statutory provisions, such
as the anti-waiver provisions ofthe Securities Acts, which by any fair interpretation
must be read as prohibiting the enforcement of such clauses. They are also not
equal when they conflict with state statutes or policies arising in conflict-of-law
cases based on diversity of citizenship, where state law still governs, whether the
forum in question is federal or state.
Such a direct conflict occurs in the Lloyd's cases. It did not occur in Bremen
or Shute, so those cases are not relevant to this problem. Such direct conflicts did
occur in Scherk and Mitsubishi, and the Supreme Court resolved the conflict in both
cases by enforcing the forum-selection clause while assuring itself that the foreign
tribunal in each of those cases would apply the specific laws which the opposing
policy was intended to protect. As we have seen, the Court assured itself in Scherk
that the Paris tribunal in question would apply the laws of Illinois, surely including
its Blue Sky Laws6 2 designed to serve the same protective function as the Securities
Acts. In Mitsubishi, the Court assured itself that the Japanese tribunal would apply
the American antitrust laws to the case referred under the forum-selection clause.
In both of these cases, the Court strongly intimated that awards emanating from
these foreign tribunals would be subject to a public policy defense if these tribunals
failed to apply those laws, and if the awards were later presented for enforcement
in the United States.
The only way the lower federal courts could resolve this conflict in the Lloyd's
cases, and be consistent with the Supreme Court cases, was to determine that the
English courts would either apply the American laws as such or, at the very least,
to provide remedies that are the substantial equivalent to the protections available
in the Securities Acts. To demonstrate how feeble and unpersuasive their attempts
to make this showing have been, I return to the focus on Lipcon, because it is fairly
representative of the reasoning in the Lloyd's cases in the other Courts of Appeal.
In addition, as the most recent of these cases,63 the Lipcon court had the fullest
61. Id. (citing Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
945, 114 S. Ct. 385 (1993) and Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993), aff'g, 784 F.
Supp. 1350 (N.D. 111. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 113, 114 S. Ct. 1057 (1994)).
62. See 815 fI1. Comp. Stat. 5/13 (West 1992).
63. Decided Aug. 5, 1998.
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opportunity for an objective assessment of the lack of fairness in the English
treatment of the American Names."
The Lipcon opinion relies on the English courts and English law to provide
"adequate remedies," and it is true there are some English statutes which provide
protection to purchasers of securities-not as stringent as, but at least comparable
to, protections under the Securities Acts.6" The problem was that Lloyd's was
exempted from liability under precisely those statutes by Section 14 of the 1982
Lloyd's Act. At the time of Lipcon evidence was also available that "no Name has
ever successfully sued Lloyd's for damages or rescission in England," that the
narrow exception of "bad faith" in the English statute giving Lloyd's immunity from
tort liability is a "very difficult burden," and, most damningly in comparison with
the Securities Acts, that "fraudulent nondisclosure by Lloyd's is not an actionable
wrong under English law because Lloyd's has been held to have no duty of
disclosure to Names."
The Lipcon court attempted to bolster its reliance on the adequacy of English
remedies by pointing out that the 1982 Lloyd's Act did not provide immunity to
member's agents, and that recent cases had in fact upheld the liability of such
agents for negligent underwriting.67 True enough. But, putting to one side the
probability that the massive claims here involved may well have bankrupted the
agents in question, and left the Names with meaningless claims, the Lipcon court
chose to ignore the fact that most of the damages or settlements recovered by
Names against member's and managing agents--to the tune of 1.5 billion
pounds-were never paid to the successful litigants. These recoveries were
appropriated by Lloyd's, to help fund the reserves in Equitas, under Lloyd's
amendment of the by-laws concerning the Premiums Trust Deed. The Lipcon court
does not discuss this problem in connection with the adequacy of the English
remedies, but mentions it only in connection with the contention-rejected by the
court-that the Names were fraudulently induced to agree to be bound by changes
in the by-laws authorized by the Lloyd's Act of 1982.68
In this desert of "me-too-ism" demonstrated by the federal courts' unanimous
enforcement of the forum clauses there is one inviting oasis: the West case in
California state court. West, a non-accepting Name, sued Lloyd's for violations of
64. Its investigation seems mostly confined to opinions expressed in the other circuit court
opinions, and that was also true of earlier cases, each relying on the others and ultimately back to a
fundamental assumption about the fairness of English courts. For example, in Roby, on which both
Hanysworth and Lipcon rely, the court said that English remedies were adequate because of "low
scienter requirements," suggesting that even a showing of negligence would suffice for recovery. 996
F.2d at 1365. In the very next paragraph the Roby court notes that the 1982 Act immunized Lloyd's
for torts except for acts in bad faith, and then concludes with this astounding statement: "Furthermore,
as a self-regulating organization, we cannot say that Lloyd's own bylaws will not insure the honesty and
forthrightness that American investors deserve and expect." (!) Id.
65. 148 F.3d at 1298-99.
66. See Affidavit of Charles Hicks, in West v. Lloyd's, No. B095440, 1997 WL 1114662 (Cal.
App. 2d Dist. Oct. 23, 1997).
67. 148 F.3d at 1297-98.
68. Id. at 1296-97.
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the California securities laws in 1994.9 That case is now reportedly set for trial in
the state court during the spring of 2000, and apparently represents the last hope of
the American Names to get a straightforward litigation of the fraud and
nondisclosure issues involved in the Lloyd's cases in an American forum."' The six-
year delay in getting this case to trial is a further demonstration of the tenacity
Lloyd's has shown in frustrating every attempt to resolve these alleged frauds in a
fair trial. Ironically, it now appears that this trial will occur because of a tactical
error on the part of Lloyd's. Its second attempt to remove the case to federal court,
where it presumably would have enjoyed the "me-too-ism" displayed by the other
federal courts, was held to be time-barred and the case was remanded for trial in the
Los Angeles Superior Court.71
The California Court of Appeal in West reviewed the federal cases and
disagreed with their result,72 concluding that, whatever the federal rule might be as
to subordination of the anti-waiver provisions of the Securities Acts to policies
favoring the promotion of international commerce, the choice-of-forum and choice-
of-law clauses in the Lloyd's agreements were void and unenforceable under
California law. The upcoming trial will be of interest to many observers.
Ill. THE*ENGLUSH JUDGMENTS STAGE OF THE CONTROVERSY
As noted earlier, the large majority of Names, including a substantial majority
of American Names, entered into Lloyd's R&R plan in 1996. Induced by "credits"
against the amount of premiums they were required to pay into Equitas, they
executed full and explicit releases to Lloyd's and all its agents. In doing so, and
paying the reduced premiums assessed against them, they bought an immediate
respite from enforcement of future claims but no protection from liability for those
claims if Equitas' reserves prove to be inadequate to pay them. Since by Lloyd's
own calculations these claims are likely to run to the year 2030, and to aggregate
more than 20 billion pounds, and since comparatively little "new money" was
69. West v. Lloyd's, No. B095440, 1997 WL 1114662 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. Oct. 23, 1997).
70. A similar case in England, involving multiple British Names as plaintiffs but under the
heading of Jaffray v. Society of Lloyd's, was also scheduled to go to trial in January 2000, also after
long delays, but I am reliably informed by an American Name that this date has again been postponed.
The Jaffray case is described in Garrow v. Society of Lloyd's, 99-0597.3,1999 WL 819070 (Oct. 13,
1999), in an appellate opinion of the Supreme Court of Judicature allowing Garrow, a non-accepting
British Name, to become a plaintiff in Jaffray as a matter of discretion, on a finding that Garrow had
a "genuine and serious claim" against Lloyd's and had been forced into bankruptcy by the claims made
by Lloyd's. Lloyd's resisted his inclusion on the ground that he had not yet paid his full premium into
Equitas (as determined by Lloyd's). A reading of the Garrow opinion will lay to rest any illusions that
the Names recruited to bear the asbesteosis disaster were all wealthy and sophisticated investors, as well
as any illusions about Lloyd's compass;,n in its pursuit of the Names down to their last farthing.
Garrow was an artist and a teacher, who lost his job, his home, his life savings, and probably also his
wife, as a result of the Lloyd's debacle.
71. See Order Remanding Case, West v. Lloyd's, U.S. District Court for the Central District of
'California, No. CV 98-116 SVW (Apr. 4, 1998).
72. Cases cited in note 29, except that at the time of the California opinion only the first Ninth
Circuit opinion had been issued in Richards, and it had rejected enforcement of the choice clauses.
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brought into the Equitas reserves, that day of reckoning may not be long deferred.
When the Equitas resources are exhausted it appears that the Names who accepted
R&R will be the target for enforcement of claims by Lloyd's. In view of the releases
they executed, for a substantial quid pro quo, their chances of avoiding
enforcement seem slim indeed.
As for the non-accepting Names, prospects are somewhat brighter. As also
noted earlier, Lloyd's appointed a Substitute Agent (AUA9) to act for these Names,
although AUA9 has clearly acted as the agent of Lloyd's in signing the Names in
question into R&R over their specific instructions not to do so. Lloyd's then paid
the premiums allegedly owed by these Names to Equitas, as conclusively calculated
by another agency of Lloyd's, and took assignments of the Equitas' claims. These
are now being reduced to judgment in the English courts against several hundred
non-accepting Names.
Enforcement against American Names will be sought as foreign money
judgments in the United States. If they are treated as conclusive in our courts, under
theories of resjudicata, they may be enforced by execution against the property of
the American Names without any opportunity for a trial on the merits of these
claims, either as to their validity or their amount. Two such judgments have thus
far been presented for recognition and enforcement, both in federal courts, one in
New York 3 and one in Illinois. 4 Both trial courts have ruled in favor of Lloyd's,
and both cases are on appeal. Discussion here will be limited to the Ashenden case
in Illinois, since that is the only opinion available to me. At least in Ashenden the
defendants did appear and were represented by counsel in the English court. It is
conceded in the federal court in Illinois, however, that the defendants were not
permitted to file any counterclaim against Lloyd's nor to question the amount of the
claim in the English court, because of the clauses in the Equitas contract.
There is no doubt that this case is governed by state law, although filed in the
federal court."' Illinois has adopted the Uniform Foreign Money Judgments
Recognition Act,76 and Lloyd's was granted summary judgment against the
Ashendens under that statute, upon the court's determination that the facts are not
in dispute. The lengthy recital of these facts by the court in almost all respects
confirms the description of events in the earlier part of this essay, including the
history and structure of Lloyd's, the operation of the syndicates, the process of
becoming a Name, the disclosure in the early 1990s of the "long tail" contingent
liabilities involving asbestos and pollution claims, the construction of the R&R, and
the forced inclusion of non-accepting Names into the Equitas reinsurance program
73. The New York defendant is W.R. Grace, but i have not been able to obtain any of the
documents involved.
74. Society of Lloyd's v. Ashenden, No. 98-C-5335, 1999 WL 284775 (N.D. I1. Apr. 23, 1999),
now on appeal to the 7th Circuit Court of Appeal as No. 99-3195. In this case, I have also examined the
Memorandum of Law cited in supra notes 17, 19,20, and Defendant's Brief on Appeal, cited hereafter
as Defendant's Brief. Lloyd's Brief on appeal is not yet due at the time of this writing, and is therefore
not available.
75. See text accompanying cases in supra note 6.
76. 735 lI. Comp. Stat. 5/12-618-626. This Uniform Act has been adopted in 30 states.
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(without the benefit of credits offered the accepting Names), through the use of the
"Substitute Agent." The "pay now, sue later" and "conclusive evidence" clauses
are described as "Further features of the plan, designed to prevent it from being tied
up in litigation ... [by] barring a Name from claiming a set-off against Lloyd's and
from disputing the amount of his reinsurance premium except in a very cursory
manner."
77
The Ashendens' defense was based on two parts of the Act, in the section
"Grounds for Nonrecognition." The pertinent language is:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if (1) the judgment was rendered
under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or procedures
compatible with the requirements of due process of law...
[and]
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if... (3) the cause of
action on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of
this state...
The trial court summarily rejected defendants' argument under (b)(3) that
the English cause of action was repugnant to Illinois public policy because
it amounted to a cognovit, pointing out that only consumer cognovits are
impermissible in Illinois. The court concludes, correctly in my opinion, that
"What they are really complaining about is the perceived lack of due
process after they received notice under which the judgments were entered
...." This defense thus folds back into the due process defense under Par.
(a)(1).
The Illinois federal court begins its discussion of the due process issue by
reciting the three "test cases" in England which confirmed (1) the authority of
Lloyd's to create Equitas, and to bind the non-accepting Names to the reinsurance
contract by the use substitute agents, (2) the validity of the "pay now, sue later
clause," and (3) the validity of the "conclusive evidence" clause. Recognizing that
all three of these propositions were used in obtaining the judgment against the
Ashendens, the court concludes:
It is clear that the Ashendens have been denied a meaningfl pre-
deprivation hearing in the English court that entered summary
judgments against them, due to the pay now, sue later, and the
conclusive evidence clauses. They were not allowed seriously to
challenge the claims brought against them by Lloyd's. However, neither
English law nor the Plan prevents the Ashendens from bringing separate
suits in England to contest the amount claimed and to present other
claims they felt they have against Lloyd's, such as their claim for fraud.
(Emphasis added).
77. The additional fact recited by the court, which I had not seen before, was Lloyd's explanation
of the reasons for creating Equitas, to "ensure Lloyd's survival." It now includes the cost of litigation
brought by Names against Lloyd's and its agents, for negligent underwriting and fraud, a most curious
example of blaming the victim.
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At several other points in the opinion the court also refers to the availability to the
Ashendens ofseparate actions in England for the alleged fraud of Lloyd's, including
joinder with pending actions.7" It also relies on the earlier federal cases discussed
at length above, enforcing the forum-selection and choice-of-law clauses of the
General Undertaking, for their conclusion that the English courts offer "adequate
remedies." '79 In doing so, it republishes for thejudgment-recognition cases precisely
that same error committed in the earlier cases. These are not simply forum selection
cases at large, in which general policies favoring an internationalist view are
dominant. These are rather cases in which Congress has by specific statutes
declared the clauses in question to be void. As we have seen, a careful reading of
the Supreme Court cases in this area makes it clear that enforcement of such a
clause in the face of the anti-waiver statutes is permissible only if the protections
given in the foreign courts to American investors are substantially equivalent to the
protections given by the Securities Acts. Those protections go well beyond claims
of fraud, and encompass claims for nondisclosure of material facts or risks by
Lloyd's. Moreover, the Ashenden court does not address the question whether a
remedy would be "adequate" even if damages awarded cannot be collected, because
the defendant can simply have them impounded for use as reserves in a reinsurance
company which it controls. In my view, it cannot now be seriously suggested that
the protections available to the Ashendens or other American Names in the English
courts are even remotely equivalent to those to which they are entitled under
American law.
One recurrent theme in the Lloyd's cases is the constant reminder that the
American Names subjected themselves to English law and courts, and that
enforcement of these clauses does no more than force them to live up to their
agreements. But this is a two-sided coin, and rarely do we see any reference to the
reverse side. In its recruitment of American Names in the United States, Lloyd's
and its agents were clearly subjecting themselves to the American laws regulating
the sales ofsecurities. These actors had access to very good legal advice, and knew
or should have known about two clear aspects of those laws: First, that
nondisclosure of material facts and risks subjected them to full legal liability; and
second, that the purchasers are not permitted to waive those protections in advance,
by any contractual agreement. If American courts do not recognize that this
balances the equation, then who will do so?
Having conceded that the Ashendens did not receive a fair hearing in the
English court, the federal district court in Illinois recognized that this constituted
a clear deprivation of due process under the holding of Fuentes v. Shevin " and its
numerous progeny: that in the absence of exigent circumstances, due process
requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard before property is seized. The court
78. See supra note 70, presumably referring to Jaffray.
79. Especially Bonny v. Society of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993). The Ashendens were
themselves also parties to one of the suits in which the forum-selection clause was enforced. Ashenden
v. Lloyd's of London, No. 96-852, 1996 WL 717464 (N.D. III. Dec. 9, 1996).
80. 407 U.S. 67,92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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attempted to squeeze the case under the exception for exigent circumstances,
arguing that the formation of Equitas was required to save Lloyd's from financial
ruin, and to honor the interests of policyholders of Lloyd's insurance. The exigency
exception to Fuentes has two legs, however, neither of which will support it in this
case. The first is that a true exigency must exist. There may have been such an
emergency at the time Lloyd's created Equitas, although that is at least open to
question. It is clear, however, that the emergency was past by the time Lloyd's took
this judgment against the Ashendens. Equitas was in full operation, and the only
exigency lay in Lloyd's haste to recover the money it had paid to Equitas to acquire
the assignment of this claim. But in any event the exception also requires "an
effective post-deprivation remedy." This leg of the exception puts the matter
squarely back into the issue of the adequacy of English remedies under the forum
selection clause, and the prognosis of adequacy fares no better here than it did there,
for the same reasons.
IV. WHAT CAN BE DONE?
An important first step in setting the record straight would be an outright
reversal of Ashenden by the Seventh Circuit, ordering summary judgment for the
defendants. At the least the Court of Appeal should remand to the district court for
a de novo factual determination of the adequacy of the available English remedies,
as those have been demonstrated to exist (or not exist) since this court decided
Bonny in 1993. Such a remand should include instructions about a standard of
adequacy to be applied, and that standard should explicitly require a waiver by
Lloyd's of its immunity from liability for tort under the 1982 Lloyd's Act, as well
as a showing that Lloyd's has legal liability for nondisclosure to Names. In the
alternative the remand could permit the Ashendens to file its counterclaims directly
in this case, for trial in the federal court in Illinois, under the very Securities Acts
and Illinois statutes designed to protect them. Anything less than one of these three
approaches will deny the Ashendens the protection to which they are entitled under
American law.
Beyond this immediate method of redress I hope that scholars who will be
studying judgment-recognition practice in the new project of the American Law
Institute, or in the development for future proposals of recognition treaties, will
consider the inclusion of devices which will assist the courts in balancing the
policies protecting American litigants with the policies promoting international
commerce. In dealing with forum-selection clauses one device which seems
promising is reflected in the suggestions just made with respect to Ashenden. An
attempt to enforce a forum-selection clause is in essence a motion for change of
venue. We already have a mechanism for dealing with problems of unfairness in
such cases, namely, a conditional dismissal dependent on the waiver of defenses,
such as a statute of limitations, which might otherwise be raised in the new forum
We should tackle the formulation of standards governing such waivers in these new
chahge of venue cases.
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V. CONCLUSION
I have said some unkind things about Lloyd's, and they needed to be said. But
I cannot finish this essay without expressing real sorrow that the historic institution
of Lloyd's, as we knew it, with a rock solid reputation for solidity and integrity, has
come to such an ignominious end. Insurance is still sold in the Lloyd's market, to
be sure, but its reputation has been severely blackened and even its structure has
changed. According to an article by Godfrey Hodgson, recently published in
England,81 Lloyd's is now down to under 4000 Names, from over 32,000 in 1988.
About 70 percent of Lloyd's market capacity is now furnished by corporate capital,
which of course has limited liability. In Hodgson's view, this means
At best, Lloyd's will soon be utterly changed. At worst, it is quite possible
that it will simply disappear, or become one of those vestigial institutions
whose "greatness" we go on about for decades after they have ceased to
be great by any objective standard.
Perhaps the most poignant part of Hodgson's epitaph is this:
Lloyd's is a parable of several of the things that have gone wrong in
British life over the last century. The most obvious point, and it has been
made over and over again, is that the Lloyd's debacle is about class
privilege. No doubt public schoolboys were more trusted at Lloyd's than
state schoolboys. Until recently, graduates were few and far between.
Skills were learned by sitting next to old Tim, and too often among the
skills old Tim imparted were cronyism, long lunches, tax avoidance and
skimming off the Names' money into offshore reinsurance companies
secretly owned by old Tim and his mates. No doubt, too, apart from the
genuine service it provided for the international insurance market and the
shipping industry, Lloyd's was also a machine for protecting the fortunes
of some very rich people. It maybe a lot less true than it was, but it is still
too true.... Most fatal of all, though, was the instinct for secrecy. Again,
Lloyd's did try to be moie open in the 1990s, but too little, and far too
late. By then, too many things that could not be admitted were going
on-as past litigation has revealed. Transparency was not an option.
81. Lloyd's on the Rocks, The Guardian, Jan. 11, 2000.
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